their amended systems of records in the Federal Register when there is a revision, change, or addition. The Postal Service™ has reviewed this system of records and has determined that this General Privacy Act System of Records should be revised to modify Categories of Records in the System, Purpose(s), and Retention and Disposal.

I. Background

The U.S. Postal Service has a Web site called keepingposted.org available for retired USPS employees who want to stay connected with postal news, events, and people. This site also provides links to other retirement resources and services.

II. Rationale for Changes to USPS Privacy Act Systems of Records

The Postal Service wants to contact postal retirees to make them aware they can find on the Keeping Posted Web site up-to-date news and information about the organization, messages to retirees from the Postmaster General, as well as continuing federal retiree benefit and other retirement resources available to retired employees. This site also provides links to other retirement resources and services.

III. Description of Changes to Systems of Records

The Postal Service is modifying one system of records listed below. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(11), interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, or arguments on this proposal. A report of the proposed modifications has been sent to Congress and to the Office of Management and Budget for their evaluation. The Postal Service does not expect this amended notice to have any adverse effect on individual privacy rights. The affected system is as follows:

USPS 100.000

SYSTEM NAME: General Personnel Records

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the Postal Service proposes changes in the existing system of records as follows:

USPS 100.000

SYSTEM NAME: General Personnel Records

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM

1. Employee, former employee, and family member information: Name(s), Social Security Number(s), Employee Identification Number, date(s) of birth, place(s) of birth, marital status, postal assignment information, work contact information, home address(es) and phone number(s), finance number(s), duty location, and pay location.

ADD NEW TEXT

9. Email Addresses: personal email address(es) for retired employees are retained in a separate database and file from other current and former employee information.

PURPOSE(S):

ADD NEW TEXT

6. To provide federal benefit information to retired employees.

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:

ADD NEW TEXT

7. Records to provide federal benefit information to retired employees are purged at the request of the retired employee.

Stanley F. Mires,
Attorney, Legal Policy & Legislative Advice.

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

Notice is hereby given that the Railroad Retirement Board will hold a meeting on March 6, 2013, 10:00 a.m. at the Board’s meeting room on the 8th floor of its headquarters building, 844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611. The agenda for this meeting follows:

Portion open to the public:

(1) Executive Committee Reports.
The person to contact for more information is Martha P. Rico, Secretary to the Board, Phone No. 312–751–4920.


Martha P. Rico,
Secretary to the Board.

[FR Doc. 2013–04184 Filed 2–20–13; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 7905–01–P

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern

AGENCY: Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).

ACTION: Notice; request for comment.

SUMMARY: The United States Government (USG) invites comments on the proposed United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern. The proposed Policy establishes institutional review and oversight requirements for certain categories of life sciences research at institutions that accept Federal funding for such research. These requirements are intended to address risks of dual use research not addressed under existing Federal regulations or guidelines. Requirement for compliance with this Policy, once finalized, will be incorporated by Federal funding agencies in accordance with their relevant statutory authorities, into the terms and conditions of awards with funded institutions that conduct research falling into the categories identified in the Policy. The public input provided through this Notice will inform future deliberations and issuance of a final Policy.


ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted electronically to: durc.policy@ostp.gov. Comments may also be mailed to: Dr. Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director—Chemical and Biological Countermeasures, Office of
Science and Technology Policy,
Eisenhower Executive Office Building,
1650 Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, DC 20504. See
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for specific information about submitting comments.

The proposed Policy is available on
the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Science Safety Security
(S3) Web site: http://www.phe.gov/s3/
dualuse/Pages/default.aspx.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr.
Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director—
Chemical and Biological
Countermeasures, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Eisenhower
Executive Office Building, 1650
Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC
20504, durcpolicy@ostp.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The United States Government (USG) invites comments on the proposed
United States Government Policy for
Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern. The
proposed Policy establishes institutional
review and oversight requirements for
certain categories of life sciences
research at institutions that accept
Federal funding for such research.

These requirements are intended to
address risks of dual use research not
addressed under existing Federal
regulations or guidelines. Requirement
for compliance with this Policy, once
finalized, will be incorporated by
Federal funding agencies in accordance
with their relevant statutory authorities,
into the terms and conditions of awards
with funded institutions (see
Applicability, Section 6.1) that conduct
research falling into the categories
identified in the Policy (see Scope,
Section 6.2). The public input provided
through this Notice will inform future
deliberations and issuance of a final
Policy.

Life sciences research is essential to
the scientific advances that underpin
improvements in the health and safety of
the public, agricultural crops and other
plants, animals, the environment,
material, and national security. Life
sciences research has and will continue
to yield benefits, but no life sciences
research comes without risk. Indeed,
certain types of research that are
conducted for legitimate purposes may
also be utilized for harmful purposes.

Such research is called “dual use
research.” Dual use research of concern
(DURC) is a smaller subset of dual use
research defined as life sciences

research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably
anticipated to provide knowledge,
information, products, or technologies
that could be directly misapplied to
pose a significant threat with broad
potential consequences to public health
and safety, agricultural crops and other
plants, animals, the environment,
material, or national security.

In general, there are risks associated
with life sciences research, such as
accidental exposure of personnel or the
environment to a pathogen or toxin.

Many existing and synergistic statutes,
regulations, and guidelines are in place
to address risks associated with
biosafety, physical security, and
personnel reliability.2 Some risks relate
directly to the characteristics of DURC—
the risk that knowledge, information,
products, or technologies resulting from
the research could be used in a manner
that results in harm or threatens society.

DURC should be evaluated for possible
risks, as well as benefits, in all these
domains to ensure that risks are
appropriately managed and benefits
realized. This proposed Policy
addresses dual use research risks
holistically, that is, the risk that
knowledge, information, products, or
technologies generated from life
sciences research could be used in a
manner that results in harm.

Given these dual use risks, the USG
issued, on March 29, 2012, its Policy for
Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern (March 29 Policy).
The March 29 Policy formalized a
process of regular federal review of
USG-funded or -conducted research
with certain high-consequence
pathogens and toxins to identify DURC
and implement mitigation measures,
where applicable. The goal of the March
29 Policy is to preserve the benefits of
life sciences research while minimizing
the risk that the knowledge,
information, products, or technologies
generated by such research could be
used in a manner that results in harm.

Funders of life sciences research and
the institutions and scientists who
receive those funds have a shared
responsibility for oversight of DURC and
for promoting the responsible conduct
and communication of such research.
The proposed Policy herein, United States Government Policy for

Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern,
addresses the institutional oversight of
DURC, and will operate in tandem with
the March 29 Policy that requires
Federal agencies to implement similar
measures for oversight of DURC.

Oversight includes policies, practices,
and procedures that are put in place
to ensure DURC is identified and risk
mitigation measures are implemented,
where appropriate. Institutional
oversight of DURC is a critical
component of a comprehensive
oversight system because institutions
are most familiar with the life sciences
research conducted in their facilities
and are in the best position to promote
and strengthen the responsible conduct
and communication of DURC. This
proposed Policy delineates the
procedures for the oversight of DURC
and responsibilities of Principal
Investigators, research institutions, and
the USG. This proposed Policy, in
addition to the March 29 Policy,
emphasizes a culture of responsibility
by reminding all involved parties of the
shared duty to uphold the integrity of
science and prevent its misuse.3 The
components outlined in the March 29
Policy and in this Policy, once finalized,
will be updated, as needed, following
domestic dialogue, international
engagement, and input from interested
communities including scientists,
national security officials, and global
health specialists.

Because institutional oversight of
DURC will be a new undertaking for
many institutions, the USG is currently
limiting the requirements in this
proposed Policy, as well as the March
29 Policy, to research that meets the
scope in Section 6.2, which focuses on
a well-defined subset of life sciences
research that involves 15 agents and
toxins and seven categories of
experiments. The USG will solicit
feedback on the experience of
institutions in implementing the Policy;
will evaluate the impact of DURC
oversight on the life sciences research
enterprise; will assess the benefits and
risks of expanding the scope of the
Policy to encompass additional agents
and toxins and/or categories of
experiments; and will update the Policy,
as warranted. Research institutions are

1 Materiel includes food, water, equipment,
supplies, or material of any kind.

2 e.g. Select Agents and Toxins Program (42 CFR
part 73, 9 CFR part 121, and 7 CFR part 331);
National Institutes of Health Guidelines on
Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules
(http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/Guidelines/
NIH Guidelines.pdf); Biosafety in Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories 5th Edition (http://
www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/
BMBL.pdf).

3 The March 29 Policy and this proposed Policy are
complemented by other extant laws and treaties
(e.g. 18 U.S.C. 175 and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention] that prohibit the development,
production, acquisition, or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes
and that prohibit the use of biological agents and
toxins as weapons.
encouraged to be mindful that research outside of the categories articulated in this proposed Policy may also constitute DURC. Institutions have the discretion to consider other categories of research for DURC potential and may expand their oversight to other types of life sciences research as they deem appropriate.

Finally, and importantly, research that meets the definition of DURC often increases our understanding of the biology of pathogens and makes critical contributions to the development of new treatments and diagnostics, improvements in public health surveillance, and the enhancement of emergency preparedness and response efforts. Thus, designating research as DURC should not be seen as a negative categorization, but simply an indication that the research may warrant additional oversight in order to reduce the risks that the knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated could be used in a manner that results in harm. As a general matter, designation of research as DURC does not mean that the research should not be conducted or communicated.

Nothing in this proposed Policy supersedes the Department of Health and Human Services and the United States Department of Agriculture Select Agents and Toxins Program’s (SAP) statutory authority or SAP regulations as published in 42 CFR part 73, 9 CFR part 121, and 7 CFR part 331.

Specific Questions

Public comments are sought on the entirety of the proposed United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern. In addition, we are seeking input on the following specific questions:

1. For institutions conducting research that involves one or more of the 15 listed agents, please describe the feasibility and anticipated burden (administrative, resources, etc.), if any, to implement the requirements of this proposed Policy. What effect, if any, do you anticipate the proposed Policy would have on your ability to support or engage in research on any of the listed pathogens or toxins?

2. Are there alternatives to the administrative requirements of this proposed Policy that could be more easily implemented by Federally-funded research institutions and that would meet the intent of this proposed Policy or the March 29 Policy? If so, please specify.

3. How could DURC oversight be usefully integrated with other existing institutional oversight processes in order to reduce duplication and any resulting excess administrative burdens on institutions?

4. For institutions who have registered an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) with the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities in accordance with the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, is it feasible for the IBC to conduct the DURC institutional review process? What are the benefits or limitations of using IBCs in this role?

5. Should research that has undergone institutional DURC review but has been determined not to be DURC be monitored for emerging DURC issues? If so, how often should such review take place?

6. Is it feasible for a single individual, the Institutional Contact for Dual Use Research (ICDUR), to be the point of contact for all dual use research-related questions to and from the funding agency? If not, who else could help fill this role?

7. The proposed Policy calls for principal investigators (PIs) to refer any research involving one or more of the 15 listed agents to an institutional dual use research review entity (Section 7.1.A). The institutional review entity will then determine whether the research can be reasonably anticipated to produce any of the seven effects, and if so, if that research meets the definition of DURC. Is it preferable to instead require PIs to determine both whether their research involves one or more of the listed agents and also whether their research can be reasonably anticipated to produce any of the listed effects? In this scenario, the institutional dual use research review entity would then only determine whether the research meets the definition of DURC. (Note: In either scenario, the institutional dual use research review entity would also assess the risks and benefits of the research and develop a risk management plan.)

8. Is additional guidance or explanation needed for interpreting the seven effects/categories of experiments listed in Section 6.2.2?

9. The USG is developing a document that contains the following analytic tools and guidance to assist in implementation of the Policy, once finalized:

a. Understanding and identification of DURC
b. Assessment of risks and benefits associated with DURC
c. Developing a risk mitigation plan for DURC
d. Responsibly communicating DURC
e. Training and education on DURC

Are there any additional tools or guidance documents that would be useful in implementing and complying with this Policy, once finalized?

10. We are interested in views on the optimum relationship between the March 29 Policy and this proposed Policy. Are there any conflicts or challenges posed by implementing both policies? Should research institutions implement review projects for DURC issues prior to proposals being submitted to a funding agency for review? (If not, funding agencies implementing the March 29 Policy will not have the benefit of input from institutional dual use review when reviewing research proposals for DURC.) If so, should the PI and/or institution designate on the grant application that such a review has taken place and indicate its findings?

11. This proposed Policy is intended to apply to projects that directly use non-attenuated forms of the 15 agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1 and/or use botulinum toxin at any quantity. Should the scope also include (please provide information to support your answer):

a. The use of any of the listed 15 agents or toxins in attenuated forms:

b. The use of the genes from any of the listed 15 agents or toxins (all genes? Only certain types of genetic information? If the latter, how could this be specified?)

c. In silico experiments (e.g. modeling experiments, bioinformatics approaches) involving the biology of the listed 15 agents or toxins

d. Research related to the public, animal, and agricultural health impact of any of the 15 listed agents or toxins (e.g. modeling the effects of a toxin, developing new methods to deliver a vaccine, developing surveillance mechanisms for a listed agent)?

12. Is the scope of the proposed Policy appropriate? If not, why not? Should the scope be expanded to all select agents, microbes, or all life sciences? If so, why? What factors should be considered in determining the final scope of oversight? What criteria might be used to determine what research should/should not be subject to oversight? If the Policy, once finalized, were expanded to cover other types of life sciences research (i.e. beyond the 15 listed agents), what effect, if any, would it have on your ability to conduct that research?

13. The USG recognizes that there may be some institutions that choose to expand their oversight beyond the 15 agents listed in Section 6.2.1 and/or beyond the seven categories listed in Section 6.2.2 or could have a DURC oversight process in place that is beyond the scope of this proposed Policy. For
those institutions, what additional agents or toxins, other categories of experiments, and/or other domains within the life sciences were considered for potential oversight? What impact has the expanded oversight had on the conduct and administration of the institution’s life sciences research?

14. The USG recognizes that there will be situations where a PI is conducting potential DURC at multiple institutions. Should each institution have oversight of these projects and if DURC is being conducted at their institution, develop and implement risk mitigation plans? Should the PI’s primary institution have this responsibility? [Refer to “Note” following Section 7.2.K]

15. The proposed Policy requires institutions that would be subject to the proposed Policy by virtue of Federal funding, to apply the proposed Policy to non-Federally funded research. Under the proposal, institutions would submit information about DURC reviews and risk mitigation plans on non-Federally funded projects to the National Institutes of Health (which may in turn refer the results and plans to the appropriate Federal agency based upon the nature of the research). Applying the DURC policy to Federally and non-Federally funded research promotes more meaningful oversight of DURC at the institutional level and fosters uniform approaches to the responsible conduct and communication of all research that may raise DURC concerns at an institution. Is this approach feasible? If not, what is the best mechanism for structuring oversight for non-Federally funded research?

16. The proposed Policy requires institutions to maintain records of DURC reviews, risk mitigation plans, and personnel training for three years. However, grant cycles are often longer than three years and DURC communications may arise even after funding has ended. This could result in situations where important records (e.g., the risk mitigation plan) are not available at the institution for certain DURC projects. Should the records-keeping requirements for this proposed Policy be longer to allow access to records over (and beyond) the lifetime of a DURC project? What is an appropriate amount of time that institutions should be required to retain such records?

Availability of the Proposed Policy


Comment Submission

Comments may be submitted electronically to: durcpolicy@ostp.gov. Comments may also be mailed to: Dr. Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director—Chemical and Biological Countermeasures, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 1650 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20504. In your response, please provide the following information:

Date
Name/Email/Phone Number
Affiliation/Organization
City, State

General Comments

Comments to Specific Questions (1–16) Listed in Supplementary Information as Follows:

Comment to Question 1
Comment to Question 2
Comment to Question 3
Comment to Question 4
Comment to Question 5
Comment to Question 6
Comment to Question 7
Comment to Question 8
Comment to Question 9
Comment to Question 10
Comment to Question 11
Comment to Question 12
Comment to Question 13
Comment to Question 14
Comment to Question 15
Comment to Question 16

You will receive an electronic confirmation acknowledging receipt of your response, but will not receive individualized feedback on any suggestions. No basis for claims against the U.S. Government shall arise as a result of a response to this request for comment or from the Government’s use of such information.

Ted Wacker,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. IC–30383; 812–14105]

UBS AG, et al.: Notice of Application and Temporary Order

February 15, 2013.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”).

ACTION: Temporary order and notice of application for a permanent order under section 9(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Act”).

Summary of Application: Applicants have received a temporary order exempting them from section 9(a) of the Act, with respect to a guilty plea entered on December 19, 2012, by UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd. (the “Settling Firm”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (“District Court”) in connection with a plea agreement between the Settling Firm and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), until the Commission takes final action on an application for a permanent order. Applicants have requested a permanent order.


Filing Date: The application was filed on December 19, 2012, and amended on January 31, 2013.

Hearing or Notification of Hearing: An order granting the application will be issued unless the Commission orders a hearing. Interested persons may request a hearing by writing to the Commission’s Secretary and serving Applicants with a copy of the request, personally or by mail. Hearing requests should be received by the Commission by 5:30 p.m. on March 12, 2013, and should be accompanied by proof of service on Applicants, in the form of an affidavit, or for lawyers, a certificate of service. Hearing requests should state the nature of the writer’s interest, the reason for the request, and the issues contested. Persons who wish to be notified of a hearing may request notification by writing to the Commission’s Secretary.


1 Applicants request that any relief granted pursuant to the application also apply to any existing or future company of which the Settling Firm is or may become an affiliated person within the meaning of section 2(a)(3) of the Act (together with the Applicants, the “Covered Persons”).